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1 Even  before  the  specter  of  the  lame-duck  president  began  looming  over  Barack
Obama’s  second  term,  his  ability  to  fulfill  his  promises  of  change  had  long  been
questioned. Neither the broad progressive agenda that the Left had hoped for, nor the
color-blind society or the postpartisan era that the outsider candidate had envisioned
ever materialized. For the critics, the lofty rhetoric of change hit the grim reality of
legislative politics.
2 This makes Michael Grunwald’s The New New Deal both a daunting task and an original
contribution to the study of the Obama presidency. His analysis focuses on the “hidden
story of change” through the prism of one of the first measures signed by the forty-
fourth president of the United States: the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA)  of  2009.  A  senior  correspondent  for  Time magazine,  Grunwald  dissects
everything you wish to know about the monstrous spending bill known as the stimulus.
With vibrant prose interspersed with colorful metaphors and exquisite quotations from
both secondary sources and new interviews, the author accomplishes the arduous task
of making 500 pages on the intricacies of fiscal policy a fascinating journey through
crisis management and the challenges of transformative politics.
3 Grunwald’s  main  purpose  is  to  rehabilitate  ARRA  from  a  controversial  short-term
economic  policy  to  a  launching  pad  for  long-term  reforms  that  will  transform
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American society—“the purest distillation of what F05B F05DObama  meant by change.” For
him, ARRA was a visionary program that has already begun to revolutionize energy,
health  care,  education,  transportation  and  taxation.  The  question,  according  to
Grunwald, is not how many million jobs were saved or created after the bill was passed,
or how many percentage points of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were added to the
economy. ARRA’s real legacy lies in the qualitative changes that it has brought to a
broad range of policy spheres, all of which are crucial to the future of the U.S. economy.
4 And yet, despite its noble ambitions, the stimulus package became taboo soon after its
passage,  most  notoriously  among  previously  supportive  Democrats,  who  quickly
distanced themselves from what became the caricature of a big-government approach
to the enduring pains of the Great Recession. For the author, “the Recovery Act […] was
oversold as a short-term economic fix, undersold as a long-term catalyst for change,
and fumbled as a political football” (9). There lies the second question that Grunwald
tackles, i.e., why the stimulus program—ridiculed as “porkulus”—became a symbol of
failure in Washington and across the country, and why it has overshadowed Obama’s
political legacy ever since its passage. The answer, argues Grunwald, is to find partly in
the  White  House’s  failed  communication  strategy  (emphasizing  job  creation  over  a
“New  Foundation”),  partly  in  people’s  tendency  to  confuse  the  stimulus  with  the
notorious banking bail-out, and in the media’s relentless focus on short-term economic
arithmetic  or  the  ludicrous  expenditures  that  ARRA contributed to  finance (among
which costumes for water safety mascots and a study of cocaine-addicted monkeys).
5 The book is  divided into three parts.  Part  I  takes  place before Obama’s  election.  It
begins with a portrait of the Democratic candidate and examines the “four pillars” of
his  political  platform (energy,  healthcare,  education and the  economy),  setting  the
ground for the future architecture of the stimulus package. One tension arises early on
in Grunwald’s book and haunts his demonstration throughout the book: the contrast
between Obama’s transformative agenda and the very cautious nature of the candidate,
whom the author describes as a “data-oriented, left-of-center technocrat who is above
all a pragmatist.” Thus, early on, Grunwald’s quest for the “New New Deal” stands on
shaky  grounds,  as  the  reporter  acknowledges  that  Obama  “wasn’t  a  policy
entrepreneur, and his campaign wasn’t about new ideas.” The second half  of Part I
examines the onset of the financial crisis and the early debates on short-term stimulus
plans during the Democratic primaries and the presidential election.
6 Part  II  (“Making  Change”)  dissects  the  internal  debates  and  long  decision-making
process  that  turned  a  two-digit  plan  (under  100  billion  dollars)  into  the  largest
spending bill  in U.S. history. At a final cost of $831 billion, ARRA is more than 50%
bigger than Franklin D. Roosevelt’s entire New Deal (in constant dollars), and twice as
big as the Louisiana Purchase and Marshall Plan combined. This story reveals the sharp
tensions between economic wisdom and political reality: while most economists agreed
that  the stimulus  plan had to  be  exceptionally  large to  prevent  economic collapse,
many advisers were wary of asking Congress for $800 billion, let alone the $1.2 trillion
that some advisers like Christina Romer (Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers)
recommended.1 Similarly, the idea of counterbalancing states’ budget cuts with federal
transfers  may  have  seemed  self-evident;  yet,  politically,  it  was  anathema  to  many
Democrats  who  anticipated  that  Republican  governors  would  take  credit  for  their
management  of  the  crisis,  while  blaming  Democratic  lawmakers  for  irresponsible
spending. 
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7 The third part of the book focuses on “change in action,” i.e., the implementation of the
complex set of policies deployed after the signature of the 1000-page stimulus bill. For
Grunwald,  many  of  these  policies  contained  in  this  “New  New  Deal”  are  in  effect
historic  reforms:  the  most  transformative  energy  bill  in  US  history,  the  biggest
education reform since the Great Society, the deepest foray into industrial policy since
FDR,  the  greatest  expansion  of  antipoverty  initiatives  since  Lyndon  Johnson,  the
biggest middle-class tax cut since Ronald Reagan and the largest infusion of research
money  ever.  As  the  author  notes,  the  groundbreaking  nature  of  these  individual
measures was largely overshadowed by debates on job creation and economic recovery.
These long-term goals, said Vice President Joe Biden are “what nobody gets about the
Recovery Act.”2
8 Grunwald’s meticulous analysis is an important contribution to the study of the Obama
presidency,  whose  legislative  record  has  often  been  underestimated.  The  author’s
argument appears particularly convincing when it comes to Obama’s so-called “moon
mission”:  clean technology.  For  Grunwald,  the  federal  government’s  unprecedented
investment in green technologies (from a few billion annually to $90 billion) not only
saved a declining industry (especially wind power), but also allowed a number of infant
industries to reach critical mass. In this sense, the author joins other voices like New
York  Times columnist  Thomas  Friedman  to  argue  that  government  incentives  and
investments are instrumental to change the dynamics of the energy market.3 From a
theoretical standpoint, this study implicitly contributes to the growing literature on
American  industrial  policy  by  unveiling  the  complex  functions  that  the  federal
government performs in the national system of innovation, e.g., allocating seed capital
to radical innovation projects or brokering deals between entrepreneurs and investors.
4
9 If the author deserves credit for shedding new light on the misnamed stimulus package,
he is not always successful at demonstrating that Obama’s reforms are groundbreaking.
At times, his exhaustive account of the politics of the stimulus leaves little room for
policy analysis and historical perspective. To begin with, despite the title of the book,
there is very little comparison between FDR and Obama’s political records. Grunwald
argues early on that the stimulus is “not the New Deal,” but rather an update of FDR’s
program for a new era, a way to “reinvent the economy” in Obama’s words. And yet,
the idea of a “New New Deal” ignores the historical legacy of the original New Deal: the
creation of the US welfare state, the significance of which can hardly be matched by
Obama’s generous and innovative reinvestment program.
10 Another lacuna resides  in  the author’s  limited reflection on the relative  continuity
between Obama’s education policy and the logic behind George W. Bush’s No Child Left
Behind. As Grunwald shows, Barack Obama and Secretary of Education Arne Duncan
embraced early on school competition and testing regimes, two ideas that would shape
Obama’s education policies like the “Race to the Top” program. Yet, these were two
pillars of the education reform undertaken by the Bush administration.5 Similarly, the
author gives little consideration to the idea that the president’s decision to devote one
third of the stimulus package to tax cuts was hardly a departure from the policies of his
predecessor. What’s more, as the author acknowledges, part of this “new” tax policy
was also bad politics to the extent that most Americans (9 out of 10) were not aware
that they had benefitted from tax breaks.
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11 In short, Grunwald’s “New New Deal” is an overstatement of an otherwise fascinating
story that deserves to be told. In reality, the author is keenly aware of the inherent
tensions  between  the  two  “Rs”  of  ARRA,  and  of  the  dilemma  that  Barack  Obama
continues  to  face  between his  cautious  and pragmatic  approach to  politics  and his
desire to bequeath a political legacy akin to transformative presidents that he admires,
whether they be Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt or FDR.
NOTES
1. Neo-Keynesian economists like Paul Krugman argued from the very beginning that anything
less than a one-trillion package would undermine the short-term impact of the stimulus and
tarnish Obama’s entire political legacy.
2. Ironically,  both Biden and Grunwald tend to leave “Reinvestment” out when they refer to
ARRA, thereby perpetuating the same short-term bias that they denounce.
3. FRIEDMAN, Thomas L., Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution—and How It Can
Renew America, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008.
4. BLOCK, Fred, “Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the
United States,” Politics & Society, 36.2, 2008, 169-206; ETZKOWITZ, Henry, and L. A. LEYDESDORFF,
Universities  and  the  Global  Knowledge  Economy:  A  Triple  Helix  of  University-industry-government
Relations, London, Pinter, 1997.
5. For a critical analysis, see RAVITCH, Diane, Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization Movement
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